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#### Perm is a prerequisite to the alternative – pedagogy must critically question subjectivity to contest broader systems of domination.

Giroux, ‘1 [Henry A. Giroux, currently holds the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University; “Pedagogy of the Depressed: Beyond the New Politics of Cynicism”; College Literature, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall, 2001)]

In opposition to these increasingly dominant views of education and cultural politics, I want to argue for a transformative pedagogy—rooted in the project of resurgent democracy—that relentlessly questions the kinds of labor, practices, and forms of production that are enacted in public and higher education. Such an analysis should be relational and contextual, as well as self-reflective and theoretically rigorous. By relational, I mean that the cur- rent crisis of schooling must be understood in relation to the broader assault that is being waged against all aspects of democratic public life. As Jeffrey Williams has recently pointed out, "the current restructuring of higher edu-cation is only one facet of the restructuring of civic life in the US whereby previously assured public entitlements such as healthcare, welfare, and social security have evaporated or been 'privatized,' so no solution can be separat-ed from a larger vision of what it means to enfranchise citizens or our repub-lic" (1999, 749). But as important as such articulations are in understanding the challenges that public and higher education face in the current histori- cal conjuncture, they do not go far enough. Any critical comprehension of those wider forces that shape public and higher education must be supple- mented by attentiveness to the conditional and political nature of pedagogy itself. This suggests that pedagogy can never be treated as a fixed set of prin- ciples and practices that can be applied indiscriminately across a variety of pedagogical sites. Pedagogy must always be contextually defined, allowing it to respond specifically to the conditions, formations, and problems that arise in various sites in which education takes place. Rather than treating peda- gogy as commodity, progressive educators need to engage their teaching as a theoretical resource that is both shaped by and responds to the very problems that arise in the in-between space/places/contexts that connect classrooms with the experiences of everyday life. Under such circumstances, educators can both address the meaning and purpose of schools in their relationship to the demands of the broader society while simultaneously being sensitive to the distinctive nature of the issues educators address within the shifting contexts in which they interact with a diverse body of students, texts, and institutional formations. Critical pedagogy locates discursive practices in a broader set of interre-lations, but it analyzes and gives meaning to such relations by defining them within particular contexts constructed through the operations of power as articulated through the interaction among texts, teachers, and students. This suggests that questions of articulation and contexts need to be highlighted as matters of ethics and politics. Ethically, critical pedagogy requires an ongoing indictment "of those forms of truth-seeking which imagined themselves to be eternally and placelessly valid" (Gilroy 2000, 69). Simply put, educators need to cast a critical eye on those forms of knowledge and social relations that define themselves through a conceptual purity and political innocence that clouds not only how they come into being but also ignores the reality that the alleged neutrality on which they stand is already grounded in ethico- political choices. Thomas Keenan rightly argues that ethics on the pedagog- ical front demands an openness to the other, a willingness to engage a "pol- itics of possibility" through a continual critical engagement with texts, images, events, and other registers of meaning as they are transformed into public pedagogies (1997, 2). One consequence of linking pedagogy to the specificity of place is that it extends the possibility of making the pedagogi- cal more political. Not only does it foreground the need for educators to rethink the cultural and political baggage they bring to each educational encounter, it highlights the necessity of making educators ethically and polit- ically accountable for the stories they produce, the claims they make upon public memory, and the images of the future they deem legitimate. Pedagogy is never innocent, and if it is to be understood and problematized as a form of academic labor, educators must not only critically question and register their own subjective involvement in how and what they teach, they must also resist all calls to depoliticize pedagogy through appeals to either scientific objectivity or ideological dogmatism. Far from being disinterested or ideo- logically frozen, critical pedagogy is concerned about the articulation of knowledge to social effects and succeeds to the degree in which educators encourage critical reflection and moral and civic agency rather than simply mold it. Crucial to the latter position is the necessity for critical educators to be attentive to the ethical dimensions of their own practice. But as an act of intervention, critical pedagogy needs to be grounded in a project that not only problematizes its own location, mechanisms of trans-mission, and effects, but also functions as part of a larger project to contest various forms of domination and to help students think more critically about how existing social, political, and economic arrangements might be better suited to address the promise of a radical democracy as an anticipatory rather than messianic goal. Jacques Derrida has suggested that the social function of intellectuals as well as any viable notion of education should be grounded in a vibrant politics that makes the promise of democracy a matter of concrete urgency. For Derrida, making visible a "democracy" that is to come as opposed to that which presents itself in its name provides a referent for both criticizing everywhere what parades as democracy—"the current state of all so-called democracy"—and for critically assessing the conditions and possi- bilities for democratic transformation (2000, 9). Derrida sees the promise of democracy as the proper articulation of a political ethics and by implication suggests that when higher education is engaged and articulated through the project of democratic social transformation it can function as a vital public sphere for critical learning, ethical deliberation, and civic engagement. Moreover, the Utopian dimension of pedagogy articulated through the proj- ect of radical democracy offers the possibility of resistance to the increasing depoliticization of the citizenry, provides a language to challenge the politics of accommodation that connects education to the logic of privatization, refuses to define the citizen as simply a consuming subject, and actively opposes the view of teaching as market-driven practice and learning as a form of training. Utopian in this sense is not an antidote to politics, a nos- talgic yearning for a better time, or for some "inconceivably alternative future." But, by contrast, it is an "attempt to find a bridge between the pres- ent and future in those forces within the present which are potentially able to transform it" (Eagleton 2000, 22).

The perm’s bottom up movements solve better than the alternative – the alt’s revolution fails because it ignores how power operates on an individual level.

Cho, ‘7 [Seehwa Cho University of St. Thomas, Minnesota; “Politics of Critical Pedagogy and New Social Movements” 26 October 2007; Accepted: 22 November 2007; Educational Philosophy and Theory,Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010]

Foucault, who was heavily influenced by Nietzsche, presents a different conceptualization of power. Instead of seeing power as ‘possession’, he maintains that it is more useful to see power as technology or mechanism. In other words, what really matters is not who has power (i.e. capitalists or the ruling class) or where power is located (i.e. the State). Rather, the real focus, according to Foucault, should be on how power operates and what mechanisms power employs (Foucault, 1980). The political implications of Foucault’s theory are enormous. Since power in the Western modern society no longer operates exclusively through the State and the State apparatus, replacing the repressive power of the State would not bring fundamental changes in the structure of power (thus, the famous phrase, ‘power is everywhere’). As such, this position tends to lead to a politics of anti-systematic changes. We should no longer be naïve enough to believe in the possibility of systemic changes via revolution, according to this position. Instead of pursuing systemic changes, the only viable option left is local grassroots democracy movements from bottom up.2 Along with the abandonment of systematic changes (including the State), individual and local struggles have become the main site of social change (a point to which I return later). Now the target of struggle is not just the State, institutions, and formal hierarchies of power, but more importantly it is everyday life and experiences— the molecular levels which power circulates and formulate subject. We have seen in recent decades a proliferation of studies on feminist pedagogies based on a ‘politics of process’, be they consensus, dialogue, pluralism, or celebration of differences (for example, Luke & Gore, 1992; Ropers-Huilman, 1998; Mahler & Tetreault, 2002; Macdonald & Sancher-Casal, 2002). The focus of this project has been to find a democratic (hopefully power-free, or less power-ridden) process of engagement, and the emphasis has very much been on anti-authority and anti-hierarchy.

#### Focus on linguistic precision makes effective activism and leftist coalition politics impossible.

#### Churchill 1996

Ward, Keetoowah Cherokee, 25+ year member of the American Indian Movement and prof of Indigenous Studies at University of Colorado Boulder. From a Native Son, pg. 460

There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension. By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate and unite them. Nonetheless, such “issues” of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers or persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what they’ve said, but about how they’ve said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda, but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of a progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Mao’s principle of criticism/self-criticism – now variously called “process,” “line sharpening,” or even ‘struggle” – in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about “the issues.” All of this happens at the direct expense of actually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something “meaningful.” In the end, it reduces to a tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that it’s high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

#### The debate community must bear witness to the atrocity of drone strikes – develops a community of witnessing able to check the worst abuses of war powers.

Hughes 12 (Evin, Georgia Southern Univ. [Float Like a Plane, Sting Like a Bomb: The Ethics of US Drone Attacks](http://nmcenter.org/attachments/awards_pieces/19/The_Ethics_of_US_Drone_Attacks.docx) [www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes\_Evin.pdf](http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes_Evin.pdf). edited for gendered language)

What Ali was able to do through his nonviolent rhetoric that is still relevant to this day was successfully make millions of people “bear witness” to the violence and irrationality of war. For example, say you are watching the news with a roommate and the news anchor, within her nicely lit and air conditioned studio, talks in a monotone about the deaths of civilians in a Pakistani market by a drone strike, and your roommate immediately changes the channel, not giving the terrible story another thought. Your roommate doesn’t understand the gravity of that devastation any more than the news anchor does; neither understands the significant socio-economical problems that the drone strike has caused in that area. How about the [person] sitting behind the joystick, the Nintendo-war-controller, pressing the buttons to release the Hellfire missiles like Mario firing at Bowser? Though the drone operator of all people probably knows the extent of the devastation [they are] causing, [they refuse] to think about it, [they hide] the truth from [them]selves. The drone “pilot,” the unenthusiastic anchor, your roommate—they are all complicit. Shoshana Felman, influential in raising issues connected with Holocaust testimony and what is called the “crisis of witnessing,” says that those that misunderstand or hide what they see are unable to take that information and “translate…[it]…spontaneously and simultaneously into meaning” (Felman 212). Famous psychologists Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan described this as disavowal—a defense mechanism in which a person refuses to recognize the reality of a traumatic perception (Evans 44). Through speeches recited on college campuses, Ali urged thousands of students to bear witness to the problems of integration and segregation, hate, and the Vietnam War. In one such speech, he links the violence in Vietnam caused by the war to the violence in the states; he stated that he would rather fight what was going on in a legal way. Not by war in a foreign country, but by nonviolent resistance right here in the United States. “Whatever the punishment, whatever the persecution is for standing up for my beliefs, even if it means facing machine-gun fire that day, I’ll face it…” (Hauser 187). Through 6 this speech, Ali led as example to all those students in the crowd, to all those seeing and not choosing to accept reality, to all those in disavowal. What Felman proposes is a community of seeing: a space into which “we can bring into consciousness what is unconscious in us”—like the college auditoriums and classrooms where Ali conducted his speeches—to analyze and make sense of events as a community (Amy 67). It is the very nature of the violence of the “war on terror” that does not allow a community of seeing. The media-attack on these countries by ingratiating news anchors take the American people and place them onto a platform where they are unable to reach a community of seeing, unable to argue the ethics of this war. We are divided, separated from the truth////////////////. Democratic representatives John Conyers, Dennis Kuncinich and many more, were calling for a truth as a community of officials when they wrote letters to the president demanding for him to publicly release the criteria on which be would elect people to be attacked by drones on his infamous kill list (Heuvel)—there has been no more coverage of the letters in the media. Unless we become conscious as a community of the truth of the violence we are creating, unless we bear witness and develop a community of seeing, we are doomed to be “locked into violences we cannot escape” (Amy 69).

#### An informed and outraged citizenry is the best check on aggressive presidential powers- empirics prove it literally ends wars

Druck ‘12 [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

There are obvious similarities between the causes and effects of¶ the public scrutiny associated with the larger wars discussed above. In¶ each situation, the United States was faced with some, or even all, of¶ the traditional costs associated with war: a draft, an increasingly large¶ military industry, logistical sacrifices (such as rationing and other¶ noncombat expenses), and significant military casualties.114 Americans looking to keep the United States out of foreign affairs obviously¶ had a great deal on the line, which provided sufficient incentive to¶ scrutinize military policy. In the face of these potentially colossal¶ harms, the public was willing to assert a significant voice, which in¶ turn increased the willingness of politicians to challenge and subsequently shift presidential policy. As a result, public scrutiny and activism placed a President under constant scrutiny in one war, delayed¶ U.S. intervention in another, and even helped end two wars entirely.¶ Thus, we may extract a general principle from these events: when¶ faced with the prospect of a war requiring heavy domestic sacrifices,¶ and absent an incredibly compelling reason to engage in such a war¶ (as seen in World War II, for example),115 the public is properly incentivized to emerge and exert social (and, consequently, political)¶ pressure in order to engage and shift foreign policy. However, as we¶ will see, the converse is true as well.

#### Public involvmement necessary to check DRONE warfare – failure to discuss these issues allows for expanded abuse of Presidential power and mass killing

Dudziak 9 (Sunday, September 27, 2009 Dudziak[On drones and the war power](http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/on-drones-and-war-power.html)¶ Posted by Mary L. Dudziak¶ Cross-posted from Balkinization: [To Whom is a Drone Loyal](http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/09/to-whom-is-drone-loyal.html)?)

In my west coast copy of the New York Times today, two stories are side-by-side: one on[disagreements within the Obama Administration](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/world/asia/27military.html?_r=1&ref=politics) about Afghanistan, and one titled “[U.S. Drone Strikes Office of Sunni Party In Iraq’s North](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/world/middleeast/27iraq.html?scp=1&sq=drone&st=cse).” These stories are related, for the politics of war, necessarily at issue in presidential decisionmaking about Afghanistan, are affected by the technologies of warfare. Drones are a technological step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining political checks on contemporary warfare. And the isolation of the people, historians of war have argued, helps enable on-going, endless war.¶ When contemplating the scope and limits of presidential war power, constitutional scholars tend to focus on the relationship between the branches and the impact of public opinion. But the existence of drones, the reliance on private contractors, and the absence of a draft are part of a shift in the political structure of American warfare, enabling presidential power.¶ The role of drones might cause us to believe that an inevitable march of technology, together with strategies of contemporary warfare, have led to the disconnect between most Americans and the wars their nation is engaged in. But military historian Adrien Lewis suggests that these developments were not at all inevitable, and that a fundamental shift in the political structure of American warmaking has occurred since Vietnam, resulting in an isolation of the people from their wars.¶ Lewis makes this argument in [The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force form World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom](http://www.amazon.com/American-Culture-War-Military-Operation/dp/0415979757) (2007). For Lewis, a loosening of the ties between the people and their government’s use of force begins with the demise of the citizen-soldier after Vietnam. The turn to all-volunteer forces, and now mercenaries (private contractors), effectively removes the American people from war. Americans became “disconnected from the wars the United States was fighting.”¶ In reaction to opposition to the war in Vietnam, “the armed forces developed doctrines for war that endeavored to mitigate or eliminate the need for the support of the people. In short, they sought a way to fight a war that was not dependent on the will of the people.” This involved a greater reliance on air power rather than land forces, and an increasing use of high tech warfare.¶ Taking the American people out of war gave presidents “greater freedom to go to war, [and] the White House and the Pentagon greater freedom to fight wars as they saw fit.”¶ In Iraq and Afghanistan, American warfare is sometimes waged by machines. This raises questions about the morality of war, when an attack can occur with only one side’s mortality at risk. It also raises questions about political constraints on warfare. We need not peer into a [future in which machines of warfare are more self-motivating than they already are](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/science/26robot.html). When, at another point on the globe, people are killed by an object that has its origins in the United States, but in its nature can owe allegiance to no one, we should ask where the people are in this war, and in their absence from the battle zone, how might they reassert their voice as a check on executive war power.

#### The alternative alone does not solve – no one knows that the language is being challenged by simply avoiding it.

#### Pure textualism discourages active politics and promotes Western knowledge systems by erasing the experiences of those unable or unwilling to comply.

#### Conquergood ‘02 [The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research pp 147. Dwight Conquergood was a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University]

In even stronger terms, Raymond Williams challenged the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of “highly educated” people who are “so driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice that there are other forms of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” such as “theatre” and “active politics.” This error “resembles that of the narrow reformer who supposes that farm labourers and village craftsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that “the contempt” for performance and practical activity, “which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves” ([1958] 1983:309).Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read. According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a hallmark of Western imperialism. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects" (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined. Transcrip- tion is not a transparent or politically innocent model for conceptualizing or engaging the world. The root metaphor of the text underpins the supremacy of Western knowledge systems by erasing the vast realm of human knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered, "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage cannot speak at all? Or, under greater or lesser duress, opt not to do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Masking Turn – rejecting the term in one instance does not change the overall attitudes – just creates a false perception

William C. Gay, Prof. Dept. of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences, UNC-Charlotte, ‘98

[“The Practice of Linguistic Nonviolence,” www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/publingnonvio.htm, Peace Review 10, n4 545-547, ACC. 1-29-09]

The specific discourse that is analogous to negative peace can actually perpetuate injustice.  Broadcasters in local and national news may altogether avoid using terms like "dyke" or "fag" or even "homosexual," but they and their audiences can remain homophobic even when the language of lesbian and gay pride is used in broadcasting and other public forums.  A government may cease referring to a particular nation as "a rogue state," but public and private attitudes may continue to foster prejudice toward this nation and its inhabitants.  When prejudices remain unspoken, at least in public forums, their detection and eradication are made even more difficult.  Of course, we need to find ways to restrain hate speech in order to at least stop linguistic attacks in the public arena.  Likewise, we need to find ways to restrain armed conflicts and hostile name calling directed against an adversary of the state.  However, even if avoidance of linguistic violence is necessary, it is not sufficient.  Those who bite their tongues to comply with the demands of political correctness are often ready to lash out vitriolic epithets when these constraints are removed.  Thus, the practice of linguistic nonviolence is more like negative peace when the absence of hurtful or harmful terminology merely marks a lull in reliance on linguistic violence or a shift of its use from the public to the private sphere.  The merely public or merely formal repression of language and behavior that express these attitudes builds up pressure that can erupt in subsequent outbursts of linguistic violence and physical violence.

#### Rejection of particular terms locks them into place

Butler ‘97

(Judith Butler Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley 1997 Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38)

Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed arc rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

## Word PIC

#### Pure textualism discourages active politics and promotes Western knowledge systems by erasing the experiences of those unable or unwilling to comply.

#### Conquergood ‘02 [The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research pp 147. Dwight Conquergood was a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University]

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Butler ‘97

(Judith Butler Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley 1997 Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38)

Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed arc rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

## 2AC FW

#### Resolved is to reduce to mental analysis.

Random House Unabridged Dictionary 2006 (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved>)

Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2. to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

#### The context of the resolution is determined before the colon.

Peck 96 (U of Ottawa; <http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/writcent/hypergrammar/colon.html>)

The colon focuses the reader’s attention on what to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea.

#### Government means the people – this is the original meaning.

Radovanović, ‘12 [Olivera Radovanović; “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian of “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World” ; Masters Thesis for Masaryk University, Department of Sociology; May 2012; http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf]

Government and state are often considered to be one and the same institution, but they actually grew independently. If we return to the original meaning of the word “government”, we could correct this misconception and say that power relations were gradually getting under control of “government”, i.e. they were developed, rationalized and centralized by the supervision of the state institutions. (Foucault 2003b: 223) Not before the eighteenth century did it come to the “governmentalization of the state.” The activities of the state took the form of government in order to focus on the conduct of its subjects and the rule of law, which is how the state itself transformed into the sum of instruments with broader programs of government. “[T]he broader strategies of government within which the instrumentalities of the state are incorporated and deployed” (Hindness 2006: 108, 109) are what counts now. In order to draw a distinction between the government and other forms of state system, Foucault introduced the term “art of government” in association with the idea of the state which is distinctive from the holder of sovereign power and refers to the population that is ruled by an institutional structure. Saying that the relation between the government and the governed became fully symmetrical would be an exaggeration, but the government to an extent indeed becomes a part of the population that is to be governed: “[g]overning ceased to be seen as existing on the external boundaries of the state; it was inside the state, inside society.” (Curtis 2002: 522) The emergence of the concept of population having its own regularities, rates of reproduction and life expectancy permitted the art of government to break away from the problem of sovereignty and territoriality. Government was now meant to manage the population, the processes it is involved in, and the institutions. (Hindness 2006: 112)

Should means criticism, not a mandate.

Oxford, ‘5 [Aug 16, 2005; http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/should?]

Definition of should in English

should

Pronunciation: /ʃʊd/

verb (3rd sing. should)

1 used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone’s actions:

he should have been careful

I think we should trust our people more

you shouldn’t have gone

* indicating a desirable or expected state:

by now pupils should be able to read with a large degree of independence

* used to give or ask advice or suggestions:

you should go back to bed

what should I wear?

* (I should) used to give advice:

I should hold out if I were you

#### A statute is a rule decided for the government

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

statute [ˈstætjuːt]

n

2. (Law) a permanent rule made by a body or institution for the government of its internal affairs

#### We meet AND counter-interpretation – public politicization is the only effective means of restriction in today’s political context – spillsover to statutory restrictions.

Druck, ‘12 [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

As these situations become more and more common—where¶ postwar assessments look at monetary, rather than human costs—the¶ fear of unilateral presidential action similarly becomes more pertinent. Unlike past larger-scale wars, whose traditional harms provided¶ sufficient incentive for the populace to exert pressure on the President (either directly or via Congress), technology-driven warfare has¶ removed the triggers for checks on presidential action. And though¶ the military actions that have raised WPR issues involved limited,¶ small-scale operations, the volatile and unpredictable nature of warfare itself could eventually put American lives in danger, a risk worth¶ considering given the increased use of drones abroad.¶ Thus, the same conditions are now in place as when the WPR was¶ enacted, creating a need to revisit the importance of the WPR in light¶ of the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare. Although it¶ might be tempting to simply write off the WPR as a failed experiment¶ in aggressive congressional maneuvering given its inability to prevent¶ unilateral presidential action in the past, the new era of warfare and¶ its effects on the populace has created a newfound sense of urgency,¶ one that requires a strong statutory barrier between the President and¶ military action abroad. Thus, we need stronger WPR enforcement as¶ it becomes easier to enter into “hostilities.”¶ While others focus on the WPR itself,161 the emphasis of this Note¶ is on the public’s role in preventing unilateral presidential action. In¶ this respect, the simplest solution for the numbing effect of contemporary warfare is an increased level of public attentiveness and scrutiny concerning military actions abroad, regardless of the lack of visible costs at home. As we have seen, once the public becomes vigilant about our less-visible foreign actions, we can expect our politicians to become receptive to domestic law. But as this Note points¶ out, the issues surrounding a toothless WPR will continue to grow and¶ amplify as society enters a new age of technology-driven warfare.¶ Thus, there is a pressing need for greater public awareness of the new,¶ and perhaps less obvious, consequences of our actions abroad.162 Perhaps taking note of these unforeseen costs will improve the public’s¶ inquiry into potential illegal action abroad and create real incentives¶ to enforce the WPR.

#### Framework as fiatrical game distances us from the material machinations of our political advocasies – leads to violent war policy and promotes bad organziaitonal decisonmaking.

Stone-Mediatore, ’10 [2010, Shari-; “Epistemologies of Discomfort: What Military-Family Anti-War Activists Can Teach Us About Knowledge of Violence”; Studies in Social Justice Volume 4, Issue 1, 25-45,; <http://phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/SSJ/article/view/2851/2371/>]

For several decades now, feminist theorists have criticized modern epistemic norms, revealing male and upper-class biases beneath seemingly neutral epistemic standards. Theorists including Genevieve Lloyd (1984), Dorothy Smith (1987), Lorraine Code (1991, 2006), Sandra Harding (1991), Linda Alcoff (1993), Val Plumwood (1993), and Carol Cohn (1993, 2003), have made compelling cases that received epistemic norms over-value traits associated with upper-class men, such as emotional detachment, certainty, and abstraction, at the expense of the more engaged and exploratory ways in which we come to know the world. The result, they suggest, is not only that our professional. institutions fail to give a fair hearing to people who are associated with the undervalued epistemic traits. Just as dangerously, those institutions tend to produce knowledge that is rigid, narrow in outlook, and inadequate for addressing human problems.1 And yet, despite feminist criticism, modern epistemic norms continue to determine who gets authorized to speak on public affairs. In the context of war, such policing of public debate is particularly troubling, for it tends to reserve authority for detached professionals, who treat war as a rational means of policymaking, while people close enough to war to appreciate its horrors are denied authority to speak .In one case, for instance, when a Columbus Dispatch reporter was interviewing a young veteran, the reporter discounted any of the young man’s remarks that seemed to him coloured by the young man’s “anger at having been sent to Iraq.”2 Similarly, when veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan gathered outside D.C. to present first-hand accounts of the violence, the veterans were virtually ignored by the mainstream media (Thompson, 2008). And in the early years of the war, when I proposed a campus forum featuring members of Veterans for Peace and Military Families Speak Out (MFSO), a colleague dismissed my proposal, commenting that such people are “not academically-oriented.”

#### Their caging of dissent prevents productive advocacy – framework fosters a faith-based politics of protest that turns government reform.

Elmer and Opel, ‘8 (Greg- Director of the Infoscape research lab and Bell Globemedia Research Chair @ Ryerson University, and Andy, associate professor Dept. of Communication @ Florida State University, Preempting Dissent: The Politics of an Inevitable Future, p. 9-16)

IN 2003 THE PENTAGON RELEASED A PLAN to create a terrorism futures market,” a predictive program that called on individuals to place bets on, among other things, where the next terrorist attack would occur. The idea was criticized for encouraging people to wager and potentially gain from possible future suffering. The Pentagon subsequently ended the program in July of 2003. This “intelligence gathering” concept, however, continues to live on in many privatized forms commonly referred to as “policy analysis markets” and most recently as “corporate prediction markets.”2 A year after the introduction of the Pentagon’s futures market, the Democratic National Convention in Boston established a “free speech zone” outside the convention hall where their proceedings were taking place. The zone consisted of concrete barriers topped by chain-link fence, razor wire, and plastic mesh—the “zone” was, in effect, a giant cage situated underneath a section of elevated subway tracks. And while the protest cage was upheld by the courts as a constitutionally acceptable way to limit free speech not a single protestor used the cage during the outside the established “free speech zone.”3 In that very same summer, Nicole and Jeffrey Rank attended a speech by US President Bush at the West Virginia State Capitol. The Ranks were handcuffed, arrested, and charged with trespassing; their offence: wearing anti-Bush T-shirts. In August 2007, the US federal government settled a lawsuit with the Ranks for $80,000 but admitted no wrongdoing.4 In March 2007, Andrew Meyer stood in front of a microphone at the University of Florida and asked former US presidential candidate John Kerry to defend his record on a number of public policy issues. After asking his relatively long-winded question, Meyer was quickly restrained by campus police. As he was being escorted out of the auditorium, Meyer pleaded in vain with the police, “don’t taze me bro,” The entire incident was captured on video and later circulated worldwide via popular websites such as You Tube. Later that same year, in October 2007, a Polish immigrant named Robert Dziekanski arrived in Canada at the Vancouver, BC, airport. After being detained without explanation and with limited English-speaking skills, Dziekanslci became agitated. In response, Canadian police repeatedly Tasered him. Videos of the incident clearly contradicted the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s version of the event. During the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, China established official “protest zones” where protestors would be allowed to gather. Permits were required to enter the zones and many of those who applied for permits were detained for the duration of the Olympics. Shortly thereafter, similar zones were established at both the Democratic and Republican Nationa1Conventions in the US. Protests at both conventions were met with a phalanx of riot police and the Republican National Convention drew international attention for the arrest of numerous journalists in what was widely described as an assault on independent media.6 The final day of the Republican National Convention was marked by the arrest of almost 400 people including over a dozen media workers. Though seemjnglv disparate these incidents mark the contours of a new governmental logic that reconfigures a democracy seemingly under threat. Buttressed by terms such as preemption, security, and inevitability, this logic is reshaping public space, reconfiguring the body politics of civil disobedience, and producing a new faith-based politics where logic and reason give way to gut instinct and blind trust. Thus, at its core, this is a book about democracy as it exists today. It is not necessari1y a warning of things to come; rather, it is concerned with a radical political project that intensifies the present by evacuating questions—and debate—about the future. This book is most concerned with invocations of an inevitable future—an oxymoron of sorts that seeks to manage, while also heightening, fears of insecurity. Given the widespread belief in the US and elsewhere that internal and external threats must be eliminated before they even materialize,7 this book seeks to reconfigure the significance of forecasting models and theories of surveillance within a political culture that seemingly requires little to no proof of threats for military intervention, arrests, incarceration, interrogation, etc. And while we set out in this book to investigate the many sites, scripts, policies, and technologies that encourage and invoke a faith- based politic (through a preemptive lens that visualizes an inevitable future), we also seek to intervene in a number of theoretical debates. While an increasing number of scholars have tended toward the biopolitical (Rose, Agamben, Foucault, Deleuze, Hardt, etc.) as a frame through which one can critique the expansion and decentralization of political power in society, it is our hope that a discussion of repression, violence, and war might expand the debate somewhat to account for an increasingly public and brash form of political sovereignty The changes we articulate transcend the borders of the United States as well as the particulars of the Bush Administration, the Democratic or the Republican parties. The rhetoric and logic of preemption have been echoed across Canada, Western Europe, Russia, and Australia. Preemptive logic extends well beyond the initiation of the Iraq War or particular reactions to terrorist violence, having appeared as a rationale for Russian violence in Chechnya,8 Australian intervention in South Asia,9 and NATO/Israeli response to Iranian nuclear ambitions. In short, we view the preemptive doctrine as both a domestic and international project that seeks to privilege action over contemplation, violence over peaceful deliberation and dialogue, calling into question the central tenets of liberal democracies. Chapter by chapter our arguments question the impact of the radical present and articulations of an inevitable future on the democratic process, the rights of citizens to protest, the control of public space through quasi-legal and militaristic means, and the development of privatized, individuated, and consumer-based forms of voting. Many of the developments that we discuss in this brief book stem from, and are exacerbated by, a political culture that actively promotes and polices the inevitable future, a myth that , we argue, serves to limit the scope and democratic possibilities of political dialogue, debate, and legislative deliberation. We refer to this overarching perspective on political as a “faith-based” politics not only because of its obvious religious overtones—though as successive American leaders and, more recently, French President Nicholas Sarkozy continue to demonstrate it remains a glaring contradiction in the supposedly secular, democratic West—but also because it implores us to have blind faith in such political leaders. As access to information continues to wane in much of the West, the political landscape has exploded with talk about trust and, more importantly, gut instinct—the place where leaders go in the absence of either time to contemplate decisions or adequate intelligence and research upon which decisions are based.’2 The faith-based politics, much like the logic of preemptive war///////////////////////////////////////////////////// and law enforcement that we discuss in this book, stems from a collapse in time, contemplative time to be exact, as threats to society, economy, and nation (security) are exacerbated and heightened. Democracy, it seems, has become increasingly incommensurate with the act of deliberation—meaning, interpretation, and intelligence have given way to action. After a short introduction to some of our key concepts outlined above—most notably preemptive politics, we develop our critique of faith-based politics through three case studies, First, we argue that faith-based political discourse works to contain not only ideological and discursive forms of dissent, but also the very mechanics and tactics of civil protest. Faith-based politics, in other words, as both Michel Foucault (1977) and Giorgio Agamben (2003) have argued, works to segment, contain, categorize, and spatialize power relations in society. In the second chapter, we discuss the growing exceptionalist logic at play in the creation of a dangerously apartheid-like system of geopolitics, where dissent and political demonstration are kept at a distance, particularly from the glare of the media spotlight. Our third chapter investigates the development and deployment of so-called “less-lethal” weapons. It is argued that in many instances such “fire and forget” technologies integrate preemptive logics that are more concerned with achieving compliance than with averting real threats. In chapter four, we focus more explicitly on the development of technologies of faith-based democracy, in particular those that articulate and redefine the act of voting and polling, and on relatively new techniques for collecting both public and private opinions on the “War on Terror.” Given the failure of surveillance and intelligence- gathering technologies and programs of the past, we discuss the growing influence of “insider trading” markets as intelligence-gathering technologies that, in keeping with the tenets of faith-based politics (privatization of public debate, inevitable futures, etc.), encourage citizens to join secretive, nefarious “insiders” (CIA, Pentagon, FBI, and possibly terrorists themselves) in placing bets on the time and place of inevitable terrorist strikes. The chapter further analyzes the immediacy and intelligence-free mechanics of contemporary futures markets, programs initiated and expanded to capture the “gut instincts” of public opinion. While the controversial “terrorist futures market” of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) serves as a particularly controversial case study, the chapter also discusses the convergence of betting as voting, a capitalization of opinion giving that calls upon the gambler- citizen to put their money where their mouth is—to draw upon their gut instincts. in the final chapter we discuss political challenges to preemptive and faith-based politics, focusing in particular on legal, rhetorical, and tactical (via protests) strategies to articulate a politics of hope in a climate of continued fear and insecurity.

### ---AT Switch Side Debate

#### Southern literary societies prove that switch side debate reinforces dominant power structures.

Westbrook, ‘2 [B. Evelyn Westbrook- PhD Rhetoric University of Texas Debating Both Sides: What Nineteenth-Century College Literary Societies Can Teach Us about Critical Pedagogies, Rhetoric Review, 21:4, 339-356 Taylor Francis]

If societies like the Athenian and Clariosophic did, in fact, train students for public office, how did they influence students to think about the issues they debated? Did students regard debates as contests to be won, diversions from otherwise banal studies, or sincere inquiries into issues of public consequences? Asking these questions of South Carolina College’s Clariosophic Society, which like most other antebellum societies was at its peak before the Civil War, gives us the chance to see members debate particularly passionate political issues at a critical moment in American history (Harding 179). Furthermore, these questions are worth asking of nineteenth-century literary societies like South Carolina’s Clariosophic Society not only because they can provide us with a more complete picture of nineteenth-century rhetorical education but also because they allow us through historical analogy to look critically at today’s writing pedagogies that similarly foreground agonistic debate. The Radical Potential of the Clariosophic Society As war clouds gathered before the Civil War, literary societies all over the United States, but especially in the stronghold of the Confederate South, grappled with serious public questions. South Carolina College’s Clariosophic Society was no exception. Like other southern societies (and like most of their northern and western counterparts), members of the Clariosophic Society vigorously debated contemporary social and political questions, including slavery and secession (Harding 193). In fact, Clariosophics debated so many political questions that one member, Maxcy Gregg, complained in his 1835 valedictory speech of the society’s preoccupation with “politics of the day.” Indeed, of the 135 questions debated between 1842 and 1847, 53 dealt explicitly with contemporary local, national, or international politics.5 Because societies were forums wherein students debated issues of the day, it is tempting to characterize them as instruments of change in a reform era. Indeed, some scholars have (Frederick Rudolph; Richard Hofstadter). However, Rita Saslaw reminds us that college literary societies were extensions of conservatie and elite institutions of higher education and therefore assumed the role of preserving the values of society for future generations. Furthermore, except at progressive schools like Oberlin, antebellum literary societies were open only to the most privileged white males. And even at Oberlin, Saslaw argues, societies “did not fill the role of a forum for social activism” but “merely succeeded in providing a protected arena for the discussion of political, philosophical, religious, and historical topics” (200, 201). If debating divisive political and social issues in the composition classroom fosters social critique, as some contend, then we might expect members of the Clariosophic Society to occasionally challenge conventional wisdom and hegemonic ideologies. Because Clariosophics’ votes indicated “their own private feelings as to the question discussed,” society minutes, which record the decisions reached on questions debated, can serve as a barometer of student opinion (Hollis 235). Thomas Harding explains that “as most questions [for debate] were settled by popular vote and the votes recorded, the decisions furnish a first-hand account of what Southern college boys were thinking about in the years that witnessed the disruption of the Union” (193). Furthermore, Harding observes that in the decades immediately preceding the Civil War, “the decisions of the Southern college societies were generally in line with the prevailing attitude toward slavery in the South” (Harding 194).6 Clariosophics’ votes on questions debated between 1842 and 1847 suggest, indeed, that even though societies encouraged discussions of contemporary questions, members consistently reaffirmed dominant Carolinian ideologies and political sentiments rather than critiquing them.7 As historians like Robert Forbes have noted, South Carolinians were “the Americans most dedicated to preserving [slavery]” (81), and South Carolina was what historian Manisha Sinha calls “the secessionist state par excellence” (187). It’s no surprise, then, that in their debates Clariosophic members doggedly upheld Confederate positions regarding slavery and secession: • Is the spirit of liberty higher in countries where there are slaves or where there are none? (debated March 12, 1842, and decided affirmatively8) • Situated as we are should our slaves be debased the means of knowledge? (debated January 7, 1843, and decided affirmatively) • Has a state the right to secede from the Union? (argued on October 31, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Is it likely that slavery will be eventually abolished? (argued on February 19, v1848, and decided negatively) The Clariosophics’ proslavery and secessionist positions reflect how deeply embedded racial slavery was in Carolinian ideology and politics: In their disapproval of providing slaves “the means of knowledge,” Clariosophics sided with Carolina’s planter politicians, who, fearing insurrection, were reluctant to permit Methodist ministers or missionaries to instruct or preach to their slaves (Ambrose 56). Furthermore, the society’s affirmative decision on the question, “Is the spirit of liberty higher in countries where there are slaves or where there are none?” reflects a characteristic Confederate defense of slavery: Historian Robert Forbes claims that Southern supporters of slavery often stigmatized challenges to slavery as threats to liberty, especially the right to property (81). The liberties and rights of white, propertied men were not surprisingly upheld by members of the Clariosophic Society who debated such questions as: • Is it not an infringement upon the inalienable rights of man for government to prohibit expatriation? (argued on February 7, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Is our right to property natural or the gift of Government? (argued March 20, 1847, and decided affirmatively) • Is the right of making wills a natural right? (argued March 27, 1847, and decided affirmatively) • Is the free agency of man compatible with the necessary order of things? (argued on November 7, 1846, and decided affirmatively) Clariosophics routinely defend the white man’s “inalienable” rights to property and citizenship. Although championing freedoms and securing individuals’ rights may seem inconsistent with proslavery positions, these sentiments also acted, as Forbes explains, as “safeguards to slavery” (70): Man’s “natural right” to property implied that slavery was the white man’s natural right. Despite Clariosophics’ staunch defense of the white man’s right to property, Clariosophics paradoxically denied a father the right to will his estate to his daughter: On the question “Ought a man to have the right of entailing all his property on his daughter?” (argued on February 5, 1842), Clariosophics decided negatively. In fact, between 1842 and 1847, members upheld sexist ideologies in all four questions (including the one listed above) that considered women’s rights and liberties: • Have the sexes naturally equal minds? (debated on May 2, 1846, and decided negatively) • Do the duties of women in Society demand for her a college Education? (argued April 3, 1847, and decided negatively) • Is the female mind naturally inferior to that of man? (considered on December 4, 1847, and decided affirmatively) Time and again, society members denied women’s rights to property and education and defended a patriarchal social order. Furthermore, despite growing awareness of the masterful female orators of the day—like South Carolina’s own Grimké sisters—Clariosophics insisted on women’s intellectual inferiority. Racism and sexism in South Carolina were, Sinha posits, two sides of the same coin: “Just as belief in race and class inequality complemented each other in Carolinian proslavery discourse, the justification of racial slavery led slavery ideologues to champion gender inequality” (90). Sinha contends, in fact, that racial, gender, and class inequality formed the ideological foundation of antebellum South Carolina’s peculiarly antidemocratic political structure. Their vindication of slavery, argues Sinha, caused Carolinian planter politicians to question the democratic ideals of universal liberty and equality, a challenge to the Declaration of Independence and to natural-rights theory that Sinha calls “counterrevolutionary.” For instance, proslavery theorists like Alfred Huger, David Gavin, and Albert Taylor Bledsoe blamed democracy and “the cult of egalitarianism” for slaveholders’ troubles (Sinha 225). And some Carolina planter politicians like James Henry Hammond went so far as to describe South Carolina’s government as an aristocracy (Sinha 226). The antidemocratic, counterrevolutionary rhetoric that Sinha documents is also reflected in many of the Clariosophics’ decisions: • Had the National Convention of France the right to depose Louis XVI? (debated on January 1, 1843, and decided negatively) • Ought the terms of Judgeship to be limited to a certainage? (argued on January 8, 1843, and decided negatively) • Was Cromwell an honest politician? (argued on November 22, 1845, and decided negatively) • Was the execution of Charles I justifiable? (argued January 17, 1846, and decided negatively) • Is an elective or hereditary monarchy better calculated to advance national prosperity? (argued on March 21, 1846, and decided negatively) • Was Brutus justified in assassinating Caesar? (argued on May 15, 1846, and decided negatively) • Is the primogeniture system a beneficial one to a nation? (argued on May 23, 1846, and decided negatively) • Should the Governor of our State be elected by the Legislature or the people? (argued on May 30, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Should our Congressmen be governed by their own sentiments or by those of their constituents? (argued on November 2, 1846, and decided affirmatively) • Are the people more easily corrupted than the Legislature? (argued on January 9, 1847, and decided negatively) • Was the administration of Cromwell beneficial to liberty? (argued on January 15, 1847, and decided negatively) Debating Both Sides 347 Downloaded by Clariosophics favored laws that would extend public figures’ terms in office. They also preferred rule by an elite rather than by the people, even though they felt that the public was less vulnerable to corruption. And although they voted against the primogeniture system, members preferred a hereditary monarchy to elected representatives. What’s more, they defended monarchs like Louis XVI and Charles I and emperors like Julius Caesar while criticizing Brutus and Cromwell. In short, then, even though society debates provided a forum for airing divisive political and social issues, members of the Clariosophic Society consistently voted to uphold Carolinian proslavery, antidemocratic, and separatist positions. Furthermore, though these debates were politically charged, they may have been regarded as purely academic exercises that were ultimately irrelevant in political spheres. Indeed, this is what Charleston planter Hugh Legare implied when he dismissed the question of whether to justify or condemn slavery on principles of natural law, calling it “a very good thesis for young casuists to discuss in the college moot-club,” but one that he and his fellow politicians would not undertake “for we have no taste for abstractions” (qtd. in Forbes 93). Another reason that societies may have failed to operate as forums for cultural and political critique is their emphasis on competition over inquiry. As Clariosophic Maxcy Gregg put it, students may have been “arguing for victory, instead of inquiring for truth.” Without much at stake in questioning the status quo, members could dramatize radical ideas while keeping a safe distance from the subversive politics they advocated. And after it all, they could slide back into their comfortable positions and even pat themselves on the back for having argued “the other side.” In today’s universities, where “diversity” is the watchword, few students could get away with the kind of blatant sexism and racism that the Clariosophics flaunted. Nevertheless, students today can still assume subversive positions for the sake of a grade, earn their mark, and then retreat to their former ideologies, feeling liberalized by the process. In fact, in “Community Service and Critical Teaching,” Bruce Herzberg shares his colleague’s experience of overhearing students admit to feigning exactly this kind of enlightenment in order to earn an “easy A” in a service-learning course (309). The critical question, then, is how to convince students—especially privileged ones—that more than their grades are at stake in classroom exercises that ask them to put their ideas and ideologies on the line.

### ---AT Fairness Impact

#### Demands for fairness celebrate institutionalized inequality.

Fish, ’93 (Stanley Fish, writer for the Atlantic professor of humanities and law at Florida International University, in Miami, and dean emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has also taught at the University of California at Berkeley, Johns Hopkins and Duke University. He is the author of 11 books, most recently “Save the World On Your Own Time,” on higher education. “The Fugitive in Flight,” a study of the 1960s TV drama, will be published in 2010., The Atlantic, Reverse Racism, or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/11/reverse-racism-or-how-the-pot-got-to-call-the-kettle-black/4638/?single_page=true>)

The same insincerity and hollowness of promise infect another formula that is popular with the anti-affirmative-action crowd: the formula of the level playing field. Here the argument usually takes the form of saying "It is undemocratic to give one class of citizens advantages at the expense of other citizens; the truly democratic way is to have a level playing field to which everyone has access and where everyone has a fair and equal chance to succeed on the basis of his or her merit." Fine words--but they conceal the facts of the situation as it has been given to us by history: the playing field is already tilted in favor of those by whom and for whom it was constructed in the first place. If mastery of the requirements for entry depends upon immersion in the cultural experiences of the mainstream majority, if the skills that make for success are nurtured by institutions and cultural practices from which the disadvantaged minority has been systematically excluded, if the language and ways of comporting oneself that identify a player as "one of us" are alien to the lives minorities are forced to live, then words like "fair" and "equal" are cruel jokes, for what they promote and celebrate is an institutionalized unfairness and a perpetuated inequality. The playing field is already tilted, and the resistance to altering it by the mechanisms of affirmative action is in fact a determination to make sure that the present imbalances persist as long as possible.